International Day of Peace 2024

The armed conflict in Colombia has lasted for over 50 years. Peace negotiations, like the historic Peace Accord between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP in 2016, have attempted to bring an end to decades of violence, and the administration of President Gustavo Petro has introduced an ambitious policy of Paz Total (Total Peace).

Under the Paz Total Policy, the current Government is engaged in Peace Talks with a variety of armed guerrilla and dissident groups, the Segunda Marquetalia, the ELN, Comuneros del Sur, and about 50% of the EMC units. In addition to this, Social legal Dialogue Spaces have recently started with right-wing former paramilitary and now high-impact criminal groups, the AGC/Clan del Golfo and the AutodefensasConquistadores de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (ACSN) – these talks face particular challenges.

Keep up to date with peace processes with the armed groups in Colombia with our timelines

In order to bring about a lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia, it is crucial to understand the long-existing societal and systemic challenges and to address the root causes of the conflict. The struggle for land in Colombia resulted in the dispossession and marginalisation of millions, particularly Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and peasant farmer communities. As of 2023, 5.1 million people had been displaced due to conflict and violence, in 2023 alone there were 293,000 persons displaced. While the civilian population continues to bear the brunt of the violence, the Indigenous, Afro-Colombian and peasant farmer communities are disproportionately affected. There are currently 8.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in rural areas of Colombia – particularly in Chocó on the Pacific coast,  and in La Guajira on the Caribbean coast.

Following the signing of the Peace Accord there was a dip in violence but the failure of the State to move into the areas vacated by the FARC-EP left a power vacuum that has been filled by illegal armed and criminal groups. A recent reconfiguration in the conflict is linked to the lack of implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord during the Duque Government and to actions of the powerful elites, many of whom have links with the high impact criminal armed groups.

Lack of implementation of the Peace Accord under the Duque Government, included the failure to provide the agreed technical and financial support to the coca leaf growers and pickers who voluntarily eradicated their crops. As a result, they have ended up in a worse socioeconomic situation than before they entered the programme. Many therefore turn to illegal mining to survive. This has resulted in an increase in coca growing and illegal gold mining.Alongside this, there has been an expansion of the illegal armed high impact criminal groups, dissident groups and guerrilla groups. These groups are currently battling one another to control illicit economies, territory and populations. This has resulted in immense suffering for civilians who are being forcibly displaced or confined in their territory further entrenching them in situations of poverty.[i]

According to Jan Egland, former UN Special Rapporteur: Colombia faces one of the largest and least known humanitarian crises on earth as armed groups grow stronger, with the number of civilians living in conflict zones having increased by 70% compared to 2021.

After his recent visit to Colombia, UN Special Rapporteur, Olivier De Schutter, stated that poverty and conflict continue to drive each other, and that peace is unattainable without addressing the societal inequalities in the country.

A lack of employment opportunities is making people in poverty an easy target for recruitment by non-state armed groups, and a lack of viable alternatives for coca farmers is leaving them with little choice but to continue growing illicit crops” Olivier de Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur

Around 13% of Colombia’s population lives in poverty, equating to around 6.6 million people. Poverty continues to disproportionately affect Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, especially in rural areas along the Pacific and Caribbean coasts, where poverty levels reach 27.3%. La Guajira, for example, is suffering from a humanitarian crisis and accounted for 30% of all child malnutrition deaths in 2023. Ongoing and escalating conflict is exacerbating poverty rates.

There is an urgent need to address the humanitarian crisis that is evolving and deepening, and to rapidly address the lack of protection for communities. One way to interrupt this continuous cycle of poverty, exclusion, conflict and control is to implement the 2016 Peace Accord, particularly the chapters on rural reform, crop substitution, the ethnic chapter and the gender perspective. The Peace Accord identified the need to rapidly establish civilian authorities and services in areas most impacted by the conflict – this commitment has singularly failed to materialise; it is therefore essential that the Petro Government move forward rapidly in implementation.

With the willingness of the current government to enact the 2016 Peace Accord, there are real possibilities to address some of the root causes of conflict in Colombia. Despite a strong political opposition in Congress, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2022-2026 has been approved, opening opportunities for addressing rural poverty. The NDP has incorporates priorities and targets of the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET) – a key agreement in the 2016 Peace Accord’s rural reform chapter.

What is lacking is the promised office in the Presidency dedicated to advancing implementation of the 2016 Accord. Whilst there is political will to implement the Peace Accord, the “Unit for Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement”, headed up by Gloria Cuartas, remains a Unit in the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (Paz Total Department). The Implementation Unit needs a higher profile, the authority to coordinate across the departments, and to leverage the budget need for rapid implementation. The key Peace Accord chapters to implement rapidly are rural reform, crop substitution, the ethnic chapter and the gender stipulations.

According to the most recent data from the Kroc Institute, the rural reform chapter 70% of the commitments made in the Rural Reform Chapter are at a minimum level of implementation. The National Plans for Comprehensive Rural Reform (PNRRIs) are being implemented at an incredibly slow pace. Nevertheless, there has been some positive progress with the establishment of the Special Agrarian Jurisdiction, and a bill introduced to establish a legal and regulatory framework for municipalities to set Unified Property Tax rates within the framework of updating the Land Registry, as well as an increase in the amount of land given to the Land Fund for re-distribution. However, the Kroc Institute warned that at the current rate it would be impossible to implement 49% of the agreements in the Peace Accord within its fifteen-year timeframe. Particularly concerning is the Kroc Institute’s prediction that, at this pace, 68% of gender stipulations and 74% of ethnic stipulations will not be implemented before the 15-year deadline.[ii]

Recommendations To Colombian Government

  • Establish an Office in the Presidency for the Implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord
  • Address rapidly the need for civilian authorities and services in the rural areas most impacted by the conflict
  • Increase the resources to implement the PDETs in consultation with local CSOs.
  • Open the Crop Substitution Programme to more people with effective and efficient administration that can comply on time with the commitments made to the coca growers and pickers.

Recommendations To the International Community

  • To increase funding for emergency aid to address the humanitarian crisis
  • Increase funding for development programmes ensuring they are targeted to indigenous, afro-Colombian and peasant farmers and women.

[i] United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Report of the Secretary-General 27 June 2024 para 64

[ii] https://curate.nd.edu/articles/report/Seven_Years_of_Final_Accord_Implementation_Perspectives_to_Strengthen_Peacebuilding_at_the_Halfway_Point/25651407?file=46221582 (p2)